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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the discussion of incentives in economics
neglects a crucial question: why are some incentives felt as
powerful reasons to alter actions, while other incentives have
little, or even counterproductive, eﬀect? We argue that an answer
to this question can be found in recent empirical work in
economic sociology, institutional economics and Austrian
economics. This work studies the meaning of incentives in
particular social settings and shows that incentives become
meaningful in relation to those settings. We demonstrate that it
illuminates why certain incentives are perceived as powerful
reasons for action, while others are mostly ignored. We also
explain why incentives are typically tied to certain social roles that
can be identiﬁed through ideal-type analysis, and why situations
of high uncertainty are of particular use for studying the activity
of actors. In order to understand entrepreneurial action, ﬁnancial
markets, and why monetary rewards and market exchange are
sometimes perceived as the wrong type of incentive, research
should focus on how an uncertain future is understood by actors.
We identify four building blocks in the work of Alfred Schutz, and
suggest they yield a constructive research program at the
intersection between economics and sociology.
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1. Introduction
The idea that incentives matter has become a near mantra in economics. However, there is
something peculiar about the idea that incentives matter, an oddity that gets little attention
in the discipline. Why are some incentives felt as very powerful reasons to alter actions at
the same time that other incentives hardly manage to produce any eﬀect at all and yet
other incentives actually have counterproductive eﬀects? Why do social norms sometimes
act as a strong incentive not to cheat, while in other situations social norms seem powerless
to prevent cheating? And why are monetary incentives often a powerful stimulus for a
certain type of behavior, yet at other times they actually work as a deterrent? This
paper argues that the start of an answer to these questions is present in current literature
at the intersection of sociology and economics.
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In this growing body of research, both economists and sociologists see the fundamental
problem of the social sciences as the question of how coordination between individuals with
diﬀerent objectives and interests can come about. Rather than thinking in objective terms
about incentives, they study how coordination comes about through processes of
meaning-making. These studies analyze how social environments and embedded incentives
come to be understood in particular ways. This work disputes the existence of ‘hard’ objec-
tive incentives, and instead see only incentives as understood by the actor. In empirical
approaches within economics, particularly the institutional branch, and in pragmatic
approaches to decision-making in sociology, we see a convergence not only in the type of
problems studied and the empirical strategies pursued, but also in their underlying theoret-
ical and methodological approach. It shows important similarities with the mid-twentieth-
century work of Alfred Schutz and his social phenomenology, and identiﬁes various meth-
odological strategies as embracing a common ‘Schutzian’ answer to the problem of mutual
coordination. Lastly, we explain why this convergence is a fruitful ground for a shared
approach to study economic interaction and human interaction more broadly.
The empirical approaches we are talking about comprise work in institutional and Aus-
trian economics on the one hand and work in the tradition of pragmatic (economic) soci-
ology on the other. In these approaches, coordination among individuals with subjective
understandings of the situation is the central theoretical problem, and empirical work
focuses on the emergence of intersubjective understandings through communication, sig-
naling, conventions, institutions, and formal or informal rules. The ﬂip side of that focus is
how shared understandings break down, are upset, and change. Although this might
sound highly abstract, there is an important diﬀerence between these approaches, on
the one hand, and alternative approaches in economics and sociology. This diﬀerence
is, ﬁrst and foremost, that everyday understandings of the social world are taken as the
starting point in these alternative approaches, something labeled as ‘the pragmatic
approach’ in sociology (Thévenot 2001). This distinguishes them from more structuralist
approaches in sociology, such as Marxist and social network analysis traditions, and the
rational choice approach in economics, based on costs and constraints.
Based on this pragmatic methodology, studies often focus on everyday understandings
of the social world. They are particularly attentive to the open-ended nature of human
action, and the potential for coordination and discoordination in social interaction. Schol-
ars involved in these traditions seek to study how intersubjective understandings coordi-
nate individual and collective plans, and how particular (powerful) agents seek to change
these understandings to their advantage. In contrast to structuralist perspectives, which
emphasize the close-ended nature of, and the determinism in existing structures, the alter-
native approach pays close attention to interpersonal meaning structures that facilitate
decision-making processes.
Nevertheless, we recognize there are diﬀerences between the individual authors within
and between these approaches, and there remain important diﬀerences between the more
sociologically and more economically minded authors. Most notably, they disagree over
the extent to which individuals are able to shape intersubjective understandings, and
the agency ascribed to these intersubjective structures. But such disagreements should
not obscure the fundamental agreement and shared conception of the problem of coordi-
nation in human interaction, or the need to study coordination processes through the for-
mation of shared understandings.
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This paper provides three contributions. First, it shows the nature of the convergence
between recent work in economic sociology and economics. Second, it demonstrates that
this convergence has one of its theoretical roots in the intersubjective social phenomenol-
ogy of Alfred Schutz, whose inﬂuence tends to be unacknowledged. The work of Schutz
will help clarify the distinctiveness of the recent convergence, and show how diﬀerent ele-
ments of diﬀerent alternative approaches might form a coherent research program. Third,
this paper applies these insights to critique the way economists tend to think about incen-
tives as objective stimuli for certain types of behavior. It demonstrates how the empirical
work discussed provides an alternative way to think about incentives as intersubjectively
understood reasons for performing a particular action. This will enrich the theory of
incentives, which do not matter objectively, independent of their meaning, but matter pre-
cisely because they have meaning to actors.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section Two identiﬁes four Schutzian ‘building blocks’
that allow us to detect shared elements in the diﬀerent empirical approaches. This provides
hints for a renewed theoretical and methodological justiﬁcation of some recent empirical
work. Section Three is devoted to a discussion of these approaches in sociology, and
Section Four examines these approaches in economics. Section Five explains why this con-
vergence is not merely an interesting opportunity for cross-disciplinary learning, but also
an important correction to prevalent ideas in sociology and economics. In particular, it
addresses what economists can learn from these alternative approaches for studying
incentives.
2. Four Schutzian Building Blocks
Alfred Schutz was one of several thinkers who brought sociology and phenomenology
together by combining the contributions of Max Weber and Edmund Husserl (Wagner
1983). For Schutz, the social world is a world of meaning in which individuals coordinate
their actions with those of others. In order for this to be possible, individuals enact ways of
understanding the world around them. What sets Schutz’s approach apart from many
other sociological approaches is that he embraces Husserl’s phenomenology to discuss
the problem of intersubjectivity in the realm of the social world. He unveils the everyday
life structures through the notion of subjectively meaningful actions as his starting point.
These experience-based understandings are the subject of his ﬁrst book Der sinnhafte
Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Our purpose here is not to give an overview of Schutz’s intel-
lectual project, which is covered by Wagner (1983) and Prendergast (1986),1 but rather
to identify four central tenets in his work.2 The following sections identify similarities
between elements of his work and recent empirical approaches in sociology and
economics.
The ﬁrst building block, and most central notion in his work, is that of Verstehen, which
lies at the core of everyday understandings of the world. Schutz adopted this interpretive
methodological position from his predecessors, especially Max Weber, but critically
expanded on it. Verstehen, for him, is relevant on multiple levels. First, there is the
1These two authors disagree on the connection between Schutz and Austrian school of economics. Augier (1999) correctly
observes that Wagner downplays the importance of this connection in Schutz’s intellectual history.
2We draw primarily on the English translation of his seminal book (Schutz 1967) and the collection of essays published in
Schutz (1962).
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problem for the actor in understanding the actions of others and drawing out his own plan
or project. Schutz thinks of individuals as coordinating their own actions with the poten-
tial actions of others in mind because interpretations of the social world of individuals are
subjective. Second, there is the problem for the outside observer, who is similarly engaged
in a project of Verstehen in order to ﬁgure out what individuals have intended or meant
with their action. This also brings up the epistemological problem of any social science
project: how much can we ultimately know about the plans and motivations of others?
In order to deal with both the ﬁrst and the second problem, Schutz argues we have a
need for the Weberian notion of ideal types, which he expands by including the everyday
life perspective and providing a way for a phenomenologically based research. This leads
us to the second building block, a discussion of how actors make sense of the (potential)
actions of others and the social world by drawing on ideal-types reasoning. This is partic-
ularly true when we move beyond the interaction of a very small number of individuals,
which Schutz sought to do. Since actors cannot form subjective interpretations of each
individual’s action, they rely on types of actions, or ideal-typical motivation, of which
the proﬁt-oriented businessman is but one example. These ideal types are not ﬁxed, but
depend on the relevant action-situation of the actor. Correspondingly, the scientiﬁc
observer faces a similar epistemological problem. If we are analyzing the real estate
market we might want to diﬀerentiate between certain ideal-typical actors such as the
ﬁnancier, the real estate agent and the home-owner, while if we are analyzing the
economy as a whole we might feel the need to form higher-order ideal types of a
greater degree of anonymity to arrive at relatively concise explanations.3
The third Schutzian building block, perhaps the most important for the purpose of this
paper, is how interpersonal coordination comes about. A central aspect of Schutz’s theory of
human action is the idea that individuals form plans or projects about their actions, and
within these projects, they have to take into account what they expect others to do. This
process of project formation4 is the coordinative and potentially disruptive process of
social interaction. As is well known, coordination is a central concept inmodern economics,
in particular in game theory, but Schutz’s primary concern is how shared understandings of
particular situations come about because only when there exists a shared understanding of
the situation are individuals likely to form correct expectations about the behavior of others.
It is here that his emphasis on intersubjectivity and the way in which situations become
socially constructed, or built-up, becomes central. In modern terms, one might say that
institutions help foster shared understandings by providing what Lachmann (1971) has
called ‘guideposts’ for the behavior of various individuals. But as we will see below, many
empirical studies in economic sociology and economics have paid particular interest to sit-
uations involving great uncertainty, where coordination is anything but given.
From interaction among individuals emerges a pattern of coordination. Schutz calls
these patterns ‘domains of relevance’ or ‘distinct provinces of meaning’, which is the
fourth building block.5 For Schutz, the social world is not a coherent whole, but instead
3Machlup (1936) applied the Schutzian distinction between diﬀerent degrees of anonymity of ideal types to the study of
economic activity, showing that problems involving diﬀerent ideal types must also involve diﬀerent methodological
approaches.
4Schutz’s work on project formation and emphasis on time originates in the work of Henri Bergson.
5In developing this concept Schutz draws on William James who analyzed reality as consisting of several sub-universes,
‘each with its own special and separate style of existence’ (James 1890, p. 291).
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a set of somewhat autonomous orders that overlap in complex ways. The provinces of
meaning create what in modern sociology is called ‘spheres or logics of interaction’,
which are internally coherent, but might conﬂict with other spheres or logics (Thornton,
Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). The strong point of Schutz is
that he explicitly distances himself from the idea that these provinces are somehow onto-
logically diﬀerent. Instead, the boundaries between them come about through the
meaning-making process of human interaction, and hence new situations can be conﬂic-
tual in part because it is not clear how they should be classiﬁed by the actors.
These four building blocks are, perhaps surprisingly, present in important strands of
the contemporary empirical literature in economics and (economic) sociology. Sometimes
Schutz’s legacy is implicitly acknowledged, while in other instances his themes have been
rediscovered quite independently from his work. His work, however, provides a good
framework for interpreting the convergence between economics and sociology. This is
not a paper in the history of ideas, so we are not primarily concerned with how these con-
temporary authors came to adopt their approach; instead, we demonstrate how they con-
verge around these four building blocks.
3. Recent Economic Sociology
A prominent description of economic sociology is that the ﬁeld seeks to combine into a
uniﬁed analysis economic interests and social relations (Swedberg 2003). This is done
in structuralist ways, where little attention is paid to meaning-making and more to under-
lying social and economic diﬀerences, and it is done in less structuralist ways, where atten-
tion is directed to actor-perspectives and processes of meaning-making (in the extreme by
such approaches as ethnomethodology, which relies completely on qualitative actor-per-
spectives). It is important to observe that Schutz cannot simply be placed within one camp.
Although his work utilizes the methodology of Verstehen, the goal is to explain social coor-
dination and social structures.
Within economic sociology, the approach of Viviana Zelizer contains similarities with
that of Schutz. Zelizer (2004) has developed the notion of ‘circuits of commerce’, which are
best thought of as distinct provinces of meaning that structure the market and provide
guidance for the behavior of individuals. Even though ‘Zelizer circuits’ (Collins 2004)
do not explicitly refer back to a phenomenological root, the two central arguments of
her work—the existence of multiple currencies that are distinct and not perfectly
exchangeable, and the idea that diﬀerent markets give rise to diﬀerent subjective experi-
ences—provide a way to trace back Schutzian building blocks. Zelizer (2005) details
how the valuation of homemaking labor is subject to a plethora of negotiations that inter-
twine love and money, and how the logic of both structures the way rewards and incen-
tives are perceived. Her earlier empirical work details the way in which life and death, or
the loss of a close relative, came to be valued diﬀerently through the rise of the markets for
life-insurance (Zelizer 1978).
In related work, Olav Velthuis (2005) describes the symbolic meaning of prices and the
intricate way in which artistic and economic ways of valuing a new work of art are nego-
tiated in the front and back room of contemporary art galleries. He demonstrates that gal-
lerists do not simply face incentives to increase or lower prices, but instead, that price
symbolizes possible paths of action in ways understood to market insiders and negotiated
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between buyers, dealers, and artists (Velthuis 2004). These works rely on actors’ under-
standings, focus on the process of coordination of plans, the associated language, and
the resulting structures of meaning.
One might be tempted to argue that this is only to be expected in these somewhat more
marginal markets. But recent explorations of the world of ﬁnance show that the same is
true of central capitalist markets. Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2002) contend that
global ﬁnancial markets work on the basis of a ‘temporal coordination’. This notion,
inspired by Schutz’s work, is used to discuss the intersubjectivity that agents in global
markets develop during the process of doing their work, especially currency trading in
global investment banks. Based on empirical ﬁndings, the authors argue that if markets
coordinate, it is because there is spatial–temporal synchronicity that allows for intersub-
jective relationships between traders. Their research delves into the work of participants
who are geographically distant, disengaged from local settings, but bound together by
global microstructures. Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2002, p. 907) contend that these ‘pat-
terns of relatedness and coordination… are global in scope but microsocial in character’.
Also, in the realm of temporal coordination, Abolaﬁa (2001) produces one of the ﬁrst
works that provide an in-depth look at subcultures of Wall-Street, showing how agents
negotiate tensions between short- and long-term plan coordination, and how the tempta-
tion toward excess spurs market activity.
The issue of interaction in ﬁnancial markets is widely discussed in economic sociology.
Based on ethnographic ﬁeldwork, Smith (2012) shows that narratives mold prices in
ﬁnancial markets since agents work in highly ambiguous environments. Thus, narratives
would provide ‘meaningful, ordered and uniﬁed accounts of how particular events unfold’
(Smith 2012, p. 141). Preda (2012) argues that foreign currency traders in uncertain envi-
ronments, where the price is set in the process of opening oﬀers and receiving coun-
teroﬀers, adapt their decisions contingently, not depending on previous decisions about
which price is optimal. Ethnographic work, such as Zaloom (2006) and Ho (2009),
show how ﬁnancial markets work from the perspective of daily life. These studies all
show the rich symbolic nature of markets, where actors attempt to make sense of the
world around them and the actions of others. Prices do not act as simple incentives in
these markets but are instead created in the process and given meaning in the narratives
that become dominant.6
The process of ‘creation’ is shown to be even more central in ﬁnancial markets that pri-
oritize the notion of performativity. This concept is used to describe the process by which
actors adopt models or concepts that were originally conceived (in scientiﬁc discourse) to
describe their actions. Holmes (2013) studies the way in which actions of central bankers
are informed by concepts and models derived from economic theory. And especially in the
ethnographic work of Miyazaki (2006), we ﬁnd an interesting way in which performativity
leads to coordination. His argument is that a particular set of (rational) trading strategies
are possible in the ﬁrst place because of a ‘faith’ in eﬃcient-market assumptions, which
entail the notion of an anticipated future, projected and managed to correspond to theo-
retical constructs. Thus, we have here, in Schutzian terms, an interesting way in which
6This ongoing sense-making is crucial since, as James Buchanan has argued, the act of choice is not based on ‘[maximizing]
utilities described in independently-existing functions’, and therefore ‘the potential participants do not know until they
enter the process what their own choices will be’ (Buchanan 1982, p. 5).
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ideal types are enacted by traders who expect other traders to behave like the ideal type. As
such, it becomes an important coordinating structure, but only because of mutual under-
standing and only within a conﬁned domain.
The notion of performativity, as used by these authors, builds on the view that coordi-
nation comes about as a result of the familiarity of the actors with the theory that is behind
their actions. Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1976), however, showed that, especially in
the cases that involve small numbers of actors, attaining a stable equilibrium may actually
get upset when the knowledge of the theory is ‘absorbed’ by the actors. In that case, some
of them might try to trick others into thinking that they are following some other theory.
This would, in turn, result in a change in the observations that others are using for their
predictions, and, consequently, the predicted equilibrium would break down.
There are two other domains worth highlighting. In the work of Boltanski and Théve-
not (2006) six diﬀerent ‘worlds’ of justiﬁcation are delineated. These are distinct and par-
tially overlapping and conﬂicting provinces of meaning. For example, their notion of
justiﬁcations found in the inspired world, and how these interact with those given in
the market world, provide excellent case studies for how diﬀerent understandings of the
world give rise to diﬀering understandings and to only partially coordinated plans, and
how discoordination and conﬂict arise. Also, they note how particular signals that are
interpreted as powerful incentives in one domain (i.e., the critical praise of peers) can
be far less powerful in another domain. David Stark (2009) has extended this framework
to analyze conﬂicts within organizations. And, from a somewhat diﬀerent background, the
institutional logics literature has analyzed conﬂict between diﬀerent ‘logics’ operating
within organizations, communities or societies (Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012).
Jens Beckert emphasized how goods and other artifacts come to be valued in the
modern economy (Beckert and Aspers 2011; see also Karpik 2010; Lamont 2012). This lit-
erature examines the question of uncertainty and ambiguity regarding how things get
valued, and how the value of goods gets justiﬁed, perceived and actively constructed. In
more recent work, Beckert (2016) has extended this to how the uncertain future is
valued. Drawing on Schutz’s work, in which actors convey information and expectations
about the future, entrepreneurship comes to play an important role as the quintessential
economic practice that transforms uncertainty into potential actions and opportunities. It
starts from the perspective of the actor, and the possibility of discoordination stemming
from uncertain future projects, and shows the process of coordination in an uncertain
world. In Beckert’s work, we thus ﬁnd the ﬁrst elements of Verstehen as well as that of
project formation.
4. Recent Economics
While it is perhaps to be expected that Schutzian elements are present in contemporary
economic sociology, his work has not been explicitly acknowledged in economics. None-
theless, we aim to demonstrate in this section that recent economic approaches contain
plenty of Schutzian ‘building blocks’. And precisely because this is not fully recognized,
there is great potential for more engagement between sociology and economics.
New institutional economics has been inﬂuenced by game theory, a theory of strategic
interaction. This has led to discussions over the nature of institutions in game-theoretic
terms. Some have argued that institutions are best understood as constraints on individual
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behavior (e.g., North 1990). This approach still relies on an objective notion of costs and
constraints. However, a more interesting approach suggests that institutions are equilib-
rium outcomes of repeated games (Greif and Kingston 2011). Multiple equilibria are pos-
sible, and through coordination, individuals settle on a particular equilibrium that turns
into a norm or a rule. These norms are self-enforcing to the extent that individuals
have an interest in following the norm given that they expect others to do the same.
The seminal example is driving on the right side of the road. A particular institutional
arrangement is but one of several possible solutions that can emerge based on the same
objective factors. As Thomas Schelling (1960, p. 57) puts it, ‘[p]eople can often concert
their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do
the same’. He describes the mechanism as involving focal points, which he explains are
‘clue[s] for coordinating behavior’. He illustrates this with an example of a husband
and a wife trying to ﬁnd each other in the department store. There is no ‘right’ or dom-
inant strategy, to solve this coordination problem; it critically depends on what they
‘expect [each other] to expect to be expected to do’ (Schelling 1960, p. 57). From this,
they may be able to choose the right place to meet. It is telling that Schelling uses an
example of a married couple and not a pair of completely random strangers, since it is
crucial for the successful coordination that participants know each other or share some
common beliefs that they can both rely on when identifying the appropriate, or salient,
focal point (Sugden 1989, 2005; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994).7
The idea that shared beliefs play a role in equilibrium selection is central in the work of
Greif (1994, 2006). His comparative study of the medieval societies of Genoese merchants
and Maghribi traders assumes that cultural beliefs, that is ‘ideas and thoughts common to
several individuals that govern interaction’ (Greif 1994, p. 915), play an important role in
shaping economic outcomes by contributing to the path dependence of the emergent insti-
tutional arrangements. Greif shows that individualistic and collectivist cultural heritages of
the Genoese and Maghribis, respectively, shaped the diﬀerent expectations that merchants
in these societies held with respect to retaliation for the cheating behavior. This, in turn,
aﬀected the institutional solutions that developed to deal with these agency problems.
Greif’s game-theoretic analysis depends on the meaning structures provided by a partic-
ular cultural and historical context, since the development of institutions as stable equilib-
ria that guide behavior through the alignment of incentives relies on shared belief systems
in the society.8 Other economists have extended this approach to study organizations and
political institutions (see Greif and Kingston 2011, Sections 5.2–5.3).
Similarly, Aoki evokes the concept of societal rules, which he deﬁnes as ‘commonly cog-
nized, salient patterns of the ways in which societal games are recursively expected to be
played’ (Aoki 2001, p. 23). They diﬀer from formal rules in that they are recursively
observed. In order to be eﬀective, these observed rules need to be shared. Aoki argues
7Another famous Schelling example is two people trying to meet in New York City. While experimental results showed that
majority of participants indeed succeeded in meeting each other by choosing the information booth at Grand Central
Station at 12 o’clock noon, the fact that this, as Schelling points out, ‘may reﬂect the location of the sample in New
Haven, Connecticut’ (Schelling 1960, p. 55n) suggests precisely the presence of a certain shared knowledge among
the sample population.
8‘In situations in which an institution generates behavior, the knowledge and information that are compressed into the
institutionalized rules enable and guide individuals, despite their limited perception, knowledge, and computational
ability, to act in a manner that leads to behavior and reﬂects the constraints on admissible beliefs and behavior that
the game-theoretic equilibrium analysis captures’ (Greif 2006, p. 126).
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that while individuals learn and form beliefs by recognizing patterns in their environment,
real shared knowledge comes in the form of cultural heritage. He demonstrates this by
comparing diﬀerent institutional solutions to irrigation problems in two villages in
Japan and Korea, showing that cultural factors had a key impact on the equilibrium
selection.
Bates et al. (1998) describe a uniﬁed methodology for combining interpretive work with
the rational choice approach. Their programmatic statement comes in the form of what
they call analytic narratives. The group of researchers involved in this program character-
ize themselves as being part of a ‘critical trend among a subset of rational choice theorists
who have been trying to integrate interpretive and rationalist accounts’ (Bates et al. 2000,
pp. 697–8). At the core of their approach is a combination of a narrative and historical
approach with rational choice theory and game theory, where the case studies and narra-
tive techniques are employed in order to ‘understand the actors’ preferences, their percep-
tions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they
form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions’ (Bates et al.
2000, p. 11), which is then used to construct a game-theoretic account. Several Schutzian
building blocks can be recognized here: there is a reliance on the method of Verstehen, the
central question is how mutual coordination can happen, and, although generally not
explicit, there is often a reliance on ideal types in analyzing the actions of diﬀerent groups.
There is also some empirical work on how entrepreneurs actively seek to change estab-
lished understandings of particular goods, which builds on the analytical narrative
approach. Shared meaning is in these studies not taken as a background against which eco-
nomic actors make decisions, but rather as a malleable foreground through which actors
try to change the possible range of projects which can be (legitimately) undertaken. In his
case study of surrogate motherhood, Pavel Kuchař has studied how entrepreneurs played
an active role in altering the understanding of contested commodities. His work demon-
strates how the illegitimate practice of ‘selling babies’ was transformed into an accepted
market for ‘renting wombs’ (Kuchař 2016). His analysis shows how what was originally
both legally and socially perceived as an illegitimate activity gets transformed into an
accepted—or even honorable—practice. He has extended this work to suggest that
market exchange, more generally, builds on accepted understandings of particular ‘arti-
facts’, which are transformed by entrepreneurs to create new market categories through
exemplary goods9 (Dekker and Kuchař 2016, 2017).
Even the new institutional approach, building on the work of Douglass North and treat-
ing institutions as rules rather than equilibria, recognizes that cultural understandings
cannot be ignored. North draws attention to the idea that ‘subjective perceptions of the
actors are not just culturally derived but are continually being modiﬁed by experience
that is ﬁltered through the existing (culturally determined) mental constructs’ (North
1990, p. 138). He develops this in work with Arthur Denzau on shared mental models
that serve as an aid to overcome uncertainty (Denzau and North 1994). Although
North makes only limited attempts to explain how such shared mental models emerge,
his approach, too, recognizes the importance of the meaning of incentives by emphasizing
the role of the diverse intersubjectively shared frameworks of mental models for interpret-
ing the environment. While his subsequent work does not put the questions of meaning at
9These exemplary goods have aﬃnities with Weberian ideal types (Dekker 2016, p. 107).
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the center of interest, his recognition of the role of meaning structures has opened the door
for many later researchers, as we demonstrate below.
More explicitly Schutzian, and more explicitly concerned with the study of the emer-
gence of shared mental models, is the recent empirical work in the Austrian tradition.
Don Lavoie (2011) has argued that economists have wrongfully restricted themselves to
price coordination only. His work has sought to explore other types of coordination.
He did so through studies of entrepreneurs, which he called the interpretive agents
seeking to develop new ways of understanding the world: ‘proﬁt opportunities are not
so much like road signs to which we assign an automatic meaning as they are like
diﬃcult texts in need of a sustained eﬀort of interpretation’ (Lavoie 2015, p. 59).
Such understanding led Virgil Storr (2004) to study diﬀerent entrepreneurial spirits in
the Bahamas. He demonstrates that a particular way of understanding entrepreneurship
based on the narrative of the pirate is central to the local entrepreneurial spirit, which
makes entrepreneurs see a range of opportunities and ways of making a deal that are
very diﬀerent from traditional notions of market entrepreneurship. The pirate, Storr
argues, is a kind of ideal-typical entrepreneur, the reliance on which structures later
actions. In more recent work he has studied the entrepreneurship of local community
leaders in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina (Storr, Haeﬀele-Balch, and Grube 2015;
Storr and Chamlee-Wright 2010). Emily Chamlee-Wright (1997) similarly started out
by studying the entrepreneurial culture in a non-standard context, in her case women
in Ghana. Her methodology is based on interviews through which she seeks to explore
how the actor’s perspectives of opportunities are structured by cultural frames. Culture
within these works serves as an interpretive lens through which entrepreneurs perceive
the world, and through which coordination in markets is made possible. Furthermore,
this work emphasizes that shared cultural frames are even more important in the
absence of formal institutional structures, and thus it acts as a complement to some of
the work in institutional economics discussed above.
A slightly diﬀerent approach that relies on the use of ideal types is the work of Roger
Koppl (2002) on ‘big players’. He explicitly develops Schutz’s notion of the levels of ano-
nymity on which social actors rely. He argues that in most markets there will be a relatively
high degree of anonymity, and thus the actors can form their expectations based on anon-
ymous ideal types. But in markets with a few big ﬁrms (oligopoly), or in markets with one
big player such as the central bank, economic actors will develop quite sophisticated inter-
pretations of the likely actions of some other actors, since in forming their expectations
small actors will have to take into account the power of the big players to make idiosyn-
cratic moves. For Koppl, the ability and willingness of certain, usually big, economic agents
to act discretionary as opposed to following a set of rules results in a distortion of expec-
tations among other agents, and in attempts by the latter to align as close as possible to the
actions of the big player. He applies this to ﬁnancial markets and the elaborate attempts to
predict the likely course of action, typically regarding the interest rate, of the central bank.
Koppl also raises the possibility that expectations need not be identical to be coordi-
nated. In such a case, coordination may be sustained even as the mental models are not
shared but diﬀer. Such ‘false mental models’ may thus nevertheless lead to a situation
where ‘the players are oriented to diﬀerent visions of the future and yet neither party is
ever disappointed’ (Koppl 2002, p. 91). While such coordination remains a possibility,
the reality of the social world nevertheless is predominately based on the shared models
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due to a mix of invariant human biological traits and ‘universal’ social principles emerging
from human interaction.
The insight emerging from these diﬀerent economic studies is that coordination in
markets depends on shared frames of reference as much as on prices. There are no
simple incentives out there; actions arise from shared understandings of what is likely
to happen and what is expected of others. In the case of contested commodities, the
buying and selling of a certain artifact is regarded improper and hence the ‘incentive’ to
do so ignored. In other instances, entrepreneurs discover new opportunities and create
‘incentives’ for others to follow. In yet others, there is no single signal guiding the way,
since the success of a projected action depends on what others will do, and hence
mutual coordination is crucial. Even more than in sociological studies, economists empha-
size ways in which shared understandings emerge and are transformed. In line with
Beckert (2016), they demonstrate that the future is not merely uncertain—it is actively
shaped through market coordination to overcome that uncertainty. The one building
block virtually absent from these studies is that of diﬀerent provinces of meaning.
5. The Meaning of Incentives, a Constructive Research Program
Above we demonstrated how a number of Schutzian themes are present in recent empir-
ical work in both economics and economic sociology. It has been acknowledged for some
time now that economics seems to be moving away from theory toward more applied or
empirical work (Hamermesh 2013), and this might foster new avenues for exchange with
neighboring disciplines. The exchange with psychology in the form of behavioral econom-
ics is a famous example of such an exchange. Meaning in this particular exchange is largely
ignored in favor of understanding underlying psychological mechanisms. This need not be
the case, as two of us have argued elsewhere, since other combinations of psychology and
economics are possible (Dekker and Remic 2018) that leave more space for a focus on
meaning. But incentives dominate the economic literature. As one of the popular books
on the subject has it: ‘an incentive is simply a means of urging people to do more of a
good thing and less of a bad thing’ (Levitt and Dubner 2005, p. 17). What could be
simpler?
It is the assumption of the simplicity of incentives that is undercut in the empirical lit-
erature we have explored. By showing how shared meaning structures coordinate the
actions of individuals it becomes clear that it is the meaning of incentives, and not their
inherent or natural force, that gives them power. There is nothing natural about the sym-
bolic value of certain photo-shoots that makes them prestigious and hence so attractive
that they do not require a payment, as in the study by Mears (2011). Nor is there anything
inherent in lower prices that make them suspicious, yet in particular settings such as
primary art markets, lower prices might function as a reason not to buy (Velthuis
2005). Similar eﬀects can be observed in the examples cited by Frey and Jegen (2001)
on intrinsic motivation, where the introduction of monetary compensation works as a
deterrent rather than an attractor for certain behavior. A classic example is the way in
which the amount of blood donated drops after payment for it because the prosocial
meaning of the act is undermined. Another example is the way in which parents interpret
a ﬁne for picking up their children late from the daycare center. Without this ﬁne more
parents were on time, as they considered this their duty; the ﬁne was interpreted as a
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price for being late which removed the duty of being on time (see Gneezy and Rustichini
2000).
This could amount to little more than a note of caution: beware of the simple use of
(monetary) incentives. The Schutzian insight is that the problem goes deeper than it
appears at ﬁrst sight. Since particular signals are interpreted in relation to the existing
intersubjective meaning structures, the real problem facing the individual is how to inter-
pret a particular signal. This is a cognitive or knowledge problem, not merely a problem of
ﬁxing the incentives. Foss and Garzarelli (2007, p. 795) drive that point home in an article
critical of the way mainstream economics deals with incentives:
Mainstream conceptions of institutions such as ﬁrms and markets ignore the positive cogni-
tive role that such institutions play, that is, their ability to coordinate diﬀerent expectations
through time is downplayed, and all attention is focused on how these institutions may align
incentives.
In other words, by thinking in terms of incentives we take for granted that these can be
meaningfully interpreted by actors in the ﬁrst place, and we ignore the institutional struc-
ture (in economic language), or the shared meaning (in Schutzian language), that makes
such interpretation possible in the ﬁrst place. Our ﬁrst conclusion is that understanding
the meaning structure within which incentives operate is essential to understanding
what eﬀects they will have.
In the previous sections we have seen that in many empirical studies a methodology of
ideal types is implicitly or explicitly developed in order to make sense of the actions of
others. This was explicitly done in Koppl’s (2002) study of big players in ﬁnancial
markets, the interpretation of whose actions involve great cognitive exertion by many
of the other players in the market, all the while they are being content to accept a fairly
simple representation of the other (small) players in the markets. It was explicit in
work on the performativity of rational-actor models in ﬁnancial markets by Miyazaki.
In the economic histories we mentioned we also saw that particular groups (as well as indi-
viduals) are modeled (often in a game-theoretic setting) as being of a certain type with a
stylized motive. This allows economic historians to analyze the various coalitions seeking
to arrive at a beneﬁcial outcome. Their eﬀort is interpretive in the sense that they try to
model the decision situation for the historical actors, but they utilize an implicit method-
ology of ideal types to analyze large-scale historical developments.
Although not all studies do this explicitly, it does open up the possibility for more
sophisticated thinking about incentives and institutional change. Many economic histories
show how conﬂict situations are reinterpreted so that cooperative coalitions can be built,
which support new institutions that shape the future expected behavior of the actors (obvi-
ously this can also happen the other way around so that others are no longer regarded as
potential coalition partners). On a smaller scale, Elinor Ostrom (1990) studied this issue
for communities seeking to overcome common-pool resource problems. This underlines
the fact that thinking about ideal types, and the mutual understanding of actors, shapes the
(potential) outcomes of a situation. Non-cooperative situations can turn into cooperative
ones. This point is emphasized within the economic sociology literature, which often dem-
onstrates the intricate ways that competition and cooperation go together in social inter-
actions, as well as the importance of certain social logics with clearly deﬁned roles
(Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Steiner 2010). This leads to our second
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conclusion: incentives are inextricably linked to the roles of diﬀerent actors, which can be
made intelligible through the methodology of ideal types.
The third building block is that of the coordination process that happens through
project formation. Economics has a long tradition of studying entrepreneurship in a
variety of settings and, as we demonstrated above, increasingly in non-market settings.
Within the Schutzian framework, every action based on a project or plan has entrepre-
neurial aspects. But, when shared meaning structures are absent or disrupted, empirical
studies of entrepreneurial behavior and the resulting coordination or conﬂicts can be
highly illuminating of how individuals understand the incentives and opportunities in
the world around them. Recent studies in the sociology of ﬁnance have highlighted how
institutions help shape expectations about highly uncertain futures, and Beckert (2016)
is a deeply Schutzian project, as demonstrated above. Increasingly, economic sociologists
have studied how uncertainty is reduced through a variety of judgment devices (Karpik
2010), and other types of coordination which act as guideposts in uncertain terrain.
Economists typically focus on prices as the primary institution providing guidance for
future economic action, but we have highlighted how they increasingly are paying atten-
tion to other institutions that help structure expectations about the future. Again, this
work is in part stimulated by game-theory, where prices are not as central as elsewhere
in economics. Moreover, Storr and Chamlee-Wright’s (2010) work on post-disaster recov-
ery shows that entrepreneurship can be social and coordination can take place through
announced actions by leaders. That work also shows how particular individuals are impor-
tant in shaping the future, a point that also comes out clearly in Koppl’s (2002) work on
Big Players, such as central banks. This leads us to our third conclusion, which is that
through the study of entrepreneurship we can grasp how diﬀerent actors understand
and imagine possible futures of the world diﬀerently. In the open-ended situations that
entrepreneurs face, we can study how they interpret the limited cues and signals about
the future and base their projects on these. Limited coordination or discoordination are
likely to occur. Empirical studies are crucial here since the way uncertainty is reduced,
or judgments are formed, diﬀers in diﬀerent markets.
The fourth building block we identiﬁed in the second section—multiple provinces of
meaning—is reﬂected in the empirical and conceptual literature in economic sociology.
It underlies the theory of the circuits of commerce, work on the diﬀerent worlds of justiﬁ-
cation by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), and the literature on institutional logics. It is also
reﬂected in empirical work in economic sociology, whose purpose is often to identify the
particular province of meaning that structures a particular market. Within economics,
however, it is harder to ﬁnd explicit instances where authors draw on the idea of
diﬀerent ‘provinces of meaning’. The exception is a paper on surrogate motherhood by
Kuchař (2016), which explicitly deals with the diﬀerent logics attached to the idea of moth-
erhood and to the exchange on markets. While nobody is in favor of selling and buying
babies, reconciling these diﬀerent logics occurs when the idea emerges that not the
baby is bought and the mother receives money for it in exchange, but instead the
womb is rented out, for which the surrogate mother can be compensated.
Empirical work can be done in economics on related issues such as ‘contested commod-
ities’ (Radin 1996). These are goods that, traditionally, have not been exchanged on
markets, or whose commodity status is contested. For these goods it is clear that compet-
ing understandings of the good are involved, linked to diﬀerent provinces of meanings and
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institutional structures. This is more relevant because markets are being designed for some
of these contested commodities, such as kidneys and school enrollment. These mecha-
nisms, which often mimic market mechanisms (although only partially), are used for
the distribution of particular scarce goods for which normal market exchange is not
acceptable. There is awareness that this project runs into what Alvin Roth (2007) has
called ‘moral repugnance’, but there is a poor understanding that this moral repugnance
is not a natural repugnance, but instead a competing set of meanings associated with par-
ticular artifacts. Just like monetary incentives might upset existing motivations, so here
market-like distribution will upset existing meanings and associations. If we wish to
make these markets function well, or to criticize them intelligently, an understanding of
the multiple provinces of meaning is necessary. The fourth conclusion we draw from
this is that markets are typically their own province of meaning which is (potentially)
in conﬂict with other social processes containing rival and complementary meanings.
To understand why markets and (monetary) incentives are sometimes not accepted, we
need to understand these interrelations.
6. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the convergence of recent empirical approaches in economics
and economic sociology along Schutzian lines. It identiﬁes four Schutzian building
blocks: Verstehen, methodology of ideal types, coordination of projected plans, and prov-
inces of meanings. Except for the fourth, they all appear in recent economic work, espe-
cially in new institutional and Austrian economics; all appear in recent work in economic
sociology.
This does not mean that there is a coherent or uniﬁed new approach; however, there is a
promising avenue for future research at the intersection of economic sociology and these
branches of economics. We have shown that this can be a constructive research program
that can contribute to a central issue in economics—how incentives work. The approaches
discussed illuminate: (i) why certain incentives are perceived as powerful reasons for
action, while others are mostly ignored; (ii) why incentives are typically tied to certain
social roles that can be identiﬁed through ideal-type analysis; (iii) why situations of
high uncertainty are useful in studying how actors make sense of the world and how an
uncertain future is understood by actors; and (iv) why monetary rewards and market
exchange sometime provide the wrong type of incentive.
To pursue this line of research, it is valuable to recognize the important contribution of
Schutz. Elements of his work can be recognized within recent empirical work in both dis-
ciplines, and his work can serve as a theoretical and methodological foundation for these
new approaches. His interpretative social science, focusing on mutual coordination by
many individuals operating in divergent provinces of meaning, is not only appropriate
for the modern plural world but can also help us analyze small-scale (micro) interaction
and large-scale (macro) interaction. It also combines elements of individual choice and
subjective valuation common to economics, with notions of norms, shared (sub)cultures,
and diﬀerent domains in society, that are found in sociology.
Incentives indeed matter, but they do not matter in and of themselves. We have to pay
attention to the general dynamics of intersubjective meaning that enable economic actors
to interpret signals. The way a particular signal is interpreted, so that it comes to be
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understood as an incentive or a disincentive for action, is crucial for understanding social
interaction. Within this research program, incentives are not objective facts of the social
world; they are thing understood by actors.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Pavel Kuchař and two anonymous referees for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Abolaﬁa, M. 2001. Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Augier, M. 1999. ‘Some Notes on Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics.’ Review of
Austrian Economics 11: 145–162.
Bates, R., A. Greif, M. Levi, and J. L. Rosenthal. 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Bates, R. H., A. Greif, M. Levi, J. L. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast. 2000. ‘The Analytic Narrative
Project.’ American Political Science Review 94 (3): 696–702.
Becker, J. 2016. Imagined Futures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Beckert, J., and P. Aspers. 2011. The Worth of Goods: Valuation and Pricing in the Economy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boltanski, L., and L. Thévenot. 2006. On Justiﬁcation: Economies of Worth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Buchanan, J. 1982. ‘Order Deﬁned in the Process of Its Emergence.’ Literature of Liberty 5: 5.
Chamlee-Wright, E. 1997. The Cultural Foundations of Economic Development: Urban Female
Entrepreneurship in Ghana. London: Routledge.
Collins, R. 2004. Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dekker, E. 2016. ‘Exemplary Goods : Exemplars as Judgment Devices.’ Valuation Studies 4 (2):
103–124.
Dekker, E., and P. Kuchař. 2016. ‘Exemplary Goods: The Product as Economic Variable.’ Schmollers
Jahrbuch 136 (3): 237–255.
Dekker, E., and P. Kuchař. 2017. ‘Emergent Orders of Worth: Must We Agree on More Than a
Price?’ Cosmos and Taxis 4 (1): 23–34.
Dekker, E., and B. Remic. 2018. ‘Two Types of Ecological Rationality: Or How to Best Combine
Psychology and Economics.’ Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (4). https://doi-org.eur.idm.
oclc.org/10.1080/1350178X.2018.1560486
Denzau, A., and D. North. 1994. ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions.’ Kyklos 47 (1):
3–31.
Foss, N. J., and G. Garzarelli. 2007. ‘Institutions as Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s
Interpretative Institutionalism.’ Cambridge Journal of Economics 31: 789–804.
Frey, B., and R. Jegen. 2001. ‘Motivation Crowding Theory.’ Journal of Economic Surveys 15 (5):
589–611.
Gneezy, U., and A. Rustichini. 2000. ‘A Fine Is a Price.’ Journal of Legal Studies 29: 1–17.
Greif, A. 1994. ‘Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical
Reﬂection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.’ Journal of Political Economy 102 (5):
912–950.
REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 15
Greif, A. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Greif, A., and C. Kingston. 2011. ‘Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?’ In Political Economy of
Institutions, Democracy and Voting, edited by N. Schoﬁeld and G. Caballero. New York:
Springer.
Hamermesh, D. 2013. ‘Six Decades of Top Economics Publishing: Who and How?’ Journal of
Economic Literature 51 (1): 162–172.
Ho, K. 2009. Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Holmes, D. 2013. Economy of Words: Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Karpik, L. 2010. Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Knorr-Cetina, K., and U. Bruegger. 2002. ‘Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies of Financial
Markets.’ American Journal of Sociology 107 (4): 905–950.
Koppl, R. 2002. Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kuchař, P. 2016. ‘Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: The Case of Surrogate Motherhood.’
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 26: 349–379.
Lachmann, L. 1971. The Legacy of Max Weber. Berkeley, CA: Glendessary Press.
Lamont, M. 2012. ‘Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation.’ Annual Review
of Sociology 38 (21): 201–221.
Lavoie, D. 2011. ‘The Interpretive Dimension of Economics.’ Review of Austrian Economics 24: 91–
128.
Lavoie, D. 2015. ‘The Discovery and Interpretation of Proﬁt Opportunities: Culture and the
Kirznerian Entrepreneur.’ In Culture and Economic Action, edited by L. E. Grube and V.H.
Storr. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Levitt, S., and S. Dubner. 2005. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of
Everything. New York: HarperCollins.
Machlup, F. 1936. ‘Why Bother with Methodology?’ Economica 3 (9): 39–45.
Mears, A. 2011. ‘Pricing Looks: Circuits of Value in Fashion Modeling Markets.’ In The Worth of
Goods: Valuation and Pricing in the Economy, edited by J. Beckert and P. Aspers. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mehta, J., C. Starmer, and R. Sugden. 1994. ‘Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An
Experimental Investigation.’ Theory and Decision 36: 163–185.
Miyazaki, H. 2006. ‘Economy of Dreams: Hope in Global Capitalism and Its Critiques.’ Cultural
Anthropology 21 (2): 147–172.
Morgenstern, O., and G. Schwödiauer. 1976. ‘Competition and Collusion in Bilateral Markets.’
Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 36: 217–245.
North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Preda, A. 2012. ‘Interactions and Decisions in Trading.’ In The Sociology of Finance, edited by K.
Knorr-Cetina and A. Preda. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prendergast, C. 1986. ‘Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics.’ American Journal of
Sociology 92 (1): 1–26.
Radin, M. 1996. Contested Commodities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roth, A. E. 2007. ‘Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (3):
37–58.
Schelling, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conﬂict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schutz, A. 1962. Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoﬀ.
Schutz, A. 1967. The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press.
16 E. DEKKER ET AL.
Smith, C. 2012. ‘Auctions and Finance’. In The Sociology of Finance, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and
A. Preda. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stark, D. 2009. The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Steiner, P. 2010. ‘Gift-Giving or Market? Economists and the Performation of Organ Commerce.’
Journal of Cultural Economy 3 (2): 243–259.
Storr, V. 2004. Enterprising Slaves & Master Pirates. New York: Peter Lang.
Storr, V., and E. Chamlee-Wright. 2010. The Political Economy of Hurricane Katrina and
Community Rebound. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Storr, V., S. Haeﬀele-Balch, and L. Grube. 2015. Community Revival in the Wake of Disaster: Lessons
in Local Entrepreneurship. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sugden, R. 1989. ‘Spontaneous Order.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4): 85–97.
Sugden, R. 2005. The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation andWelfare. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Swedberg, R. 2003. Principles of Economic Sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Thévenot, L. 2001. ‘Pragmatic Regimes Governing the Engagement with the World.’ In The Practice
Turn in Contemporary Theory, edited by T. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina and E. von Savigny.
New York: Routledge.
Thornton, P., W. Ocasio, and M. Lounsbury. 2012. The Institutional Logics Perspective: A New
Approach to Culture, Structure, and Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velthuis, O. 2004. ‘An Interpretive Approach to Meanings of Prices.’ Review of Austrian Economics
17 (4): 371–386.
Velthuis, O. 2005. Talking Prices: Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the Market for Contemporary Art.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wagner, H. 1983. Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Zaloom, C. 2006. Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Zelizer, V. 1978. ‘Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th-
Century America.’ American Journal of Sociology 84 (3): 591–610.
Zelizer, V. 2004. ‘Circuits of Commerce.’ In Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs, edited by J. C.
Alexander, G. T. Marx and C. L. Williams. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Zelizer, V. 2005. The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 17
